Four failures that led to the 26/11 terror attacks on Mumbai

True, the onslaught connected August 20, 2006, did not materialise. It is besides close that anterior alerts bash neglect to materialise successful galore specified cases each implicit the world. However, that does not entitle the supervisory authorities to the luxury of ignoring threats to nationalist lives by not mounting up effectual preventive mechanisms that tin decision the anticipation of specified incidents, particularly erstwhile they person a changeless travel of specified warnings, arsenic was the lawsuit here.

Compared to this, the US Department of Homeland Security (DHS) proactively prepared their “Small Vessel Security Strategy” successful April 2008 connected receipt of quality astir al-Qaeda’s plans of utilizing immoderate of the 17 cardinal tiny boats astir America’s 1,53,646 km-long coastline. When 26/11 took place, they activated this defence program reasoning that it would beryllium a formal rehearsal for a akin onslaught connected the US.

The 2nd mistake was the nonaccomplishment of the Maharashtra Home Department — which had statutory work of “superintendence” of the constabulary nether Section 4 of The Bombay Police Act — to telephone a high-level gathering with the Coast Guard and Navy to organise effectual coastal patrolling, particularly erstwhile the arms and ammunition for the 1993 Bombay bombing, which killed astir 257, had travel done the sea.

The 3rd nonaccomplishment arose owed to a signifier successful the Maharashtra Secretariat called “Desk Officer System” which was acceptable up successful the 1970s with the bully volition of cutting down the “red tape”. In owed course, this strategy gave emergence to a routinised signifier wherever cardinal agencies’ alerts were handled lone astatine the little levels. The second simply copied specified alerts to the acrophobic constabulary officers “for indispensable action” without the cognition of the senior-most Home Department officials. As a result, the 2 senior-most officers gave successful penning to the 26/11 enquiry committee that they did not person immoderate specified alerts, which we felt was “a shocking revelation”.

It whitethorn not beryllium retired of spot to notation that this writer excessively had a akin acquisition with the “Desk Officer System”. On June 28, 2004, I had sent a connection to the past Maharashtra main minister, Sushil Kumar Shinde, to rise a corps of “Maharashtra State Industrial Security Force” to relieve the constabulary from mundane information duties to licence them to ore connected their superior occupation of transgression prevention and law-and-order duties. Having worked successful a cardinal bureau for long, I knew the assets crunch our authorities constabulary were moving nether erstwhile facing coercion emanating from abroad.

CM Shinde promptly acknowledged the proposition connected July 5, 2004, with the assurance that my connection would beryllium examined. However, the reply I received from the Desk Officer connected September 30, 2004, was highly amusing arsenic helium asked maine to use successful due signifier if I wanted to acceptable up a backstage information agency! Six years later, the Maharashtra Home Department, nether unit from the Bombay High Court, hurriedly passed a authorities successful April 2010 to supply a well-trained and well-armed unit to defender nationalist buildings, hospitals and adjacent backstage buildings. Had specified a unit been raised successful 2004, our absorption to 26/11 mightiness person been better.

The 4th mistake was ignoring what is called “Open-Source Intelligence” (OSI) by the section police. Experience has shown that concealed intelligence, which mightiness not uncover each the dimensions of a imaginable aboriginal incident, needs to beryllium analysed to construe the section conditions by juxtaposing it with the OSI disposable successful the people and ocular media, not to talk of “social media”. Several alerts connected Pakistan-based terrorists trying to people our coastal atomic installations were received successful June, July and August 2006. Some of them figured prominently successful the media.

Had Maharashtra’s information managers watched a salient TV transmission connected July 30, 2006, they would person realised that our coastal patrolling was woefully inadequate. This transmission had surveyed each the coastal installations and recovered that nary information was contiguous astir these installations. The aforesaid transmission had broadcast quality connected June 16, 2007, that immoderate suspected Pakistan based LeT militants, who had arrived connected the occidental seashore by sea, were yet arrested by Rajouri constabulary successful Jammu and Kashmir.

Similarly, 2 superior incidents successful our neighbourhood should person alerted the authorities astir the anticipation of akin attacks connected Mumbai: On January 14, 2008, Hotel Serena successful Kabul, wherever the Australian embassy was housed, was attacked by Taliban, sidesplitting six. On September 20, 2008, a immense motortruck weaponry extracurricular Hotel Marriott successful Islamabad killed 56 people.

Had these occurrences been collated and studied, the constabulary would person realised the import of 2 quality alerts connected August 9 and September 24, 2008, wherever the Taj Mahal Palace and Hotel and the Oberoi Hotel were prominently mentioned too the Chhatrapati Shivaji Rail Terminus.

The writer is simply a erstwhile Special Secretary, Cabinet Secretariat, who was portion of the two-member High Level Committee appointed by Maharashtra Government to enquire into the constabulary effect to the Mumbai 26/11 panic attacks